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Abstract
In this article I discuss the little examined relationship between time and patient 
autonomy. Using the findings from a study on the experience of premenopausal can-
cer patients making fertility preservation decisions during their treatment, I focus on 
how the patients in the study understood time, and how this understanding interacted 
with and influenced their decision-making. I then analyse in more depth the impor-
tance of time in patient decision-making, and the relationship of time to concepts 
of patient autonomy and decision-making in the field of bioethics more generally. 
Focusing on the relational conception of autonomy, I conclude that time is an inte-
gral part of patient autonomy which warrants further research, such that it can be 
better integrated into concepts of patient autonomy, and the policy and guidelines 
that they inform and influence.
Keywords Time · Empirical ethics · Oncofertility · Relational autonomy · Sociology 
and bioethics · Sociological bioethics · Time and patient autonomy
1 Introduction
Time and patient autonomy are not always academic bedfellows. In many discus-
sions of patient autonomy in bioethics, the concept of time is given little considera-
tion. Some writers, such as sociologists Zerubavel (1979) and Adam (1990), would 
go so far as to say that the social sciences pay insufficient attention to time. Fur-
thermore, social scientists focus on ‘real time’ or ‘physical time’ and tend to ignore 
the multifaceted nature of time as a social phenomenon (Adam 1990). Zerubavel 
argues that time and the study of temporality, as he calls it, may be consistently 
neglected because time is such “an inherent constituent of social life, and therefore, 
tends to be taken for granted and ignored as a special focus of attention” (1979, p. 
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xi). By extension, I would argue the same of medical sociology and bioethics; much 
of the work on autonomy, decision-making and time more generally has focused on 
time pressures and decision-making, often taking place in the field of psychology, 
for example, in Decision Field Theory (Busemeyer and Townsend 1993). Zerubavel, 
who famously studied the role of time in social organisations through an ethnogra-
phy at a hospital, argues that while the study took place in a hospital, his research 
was not intended to be a study of the hospital or medicine with respect to time 
(1979, p. xvii). In bioethics there is a similar pattern; very little work has focused on 
the relationship between time and decision-making at all (Scully et al. 2007).
Social time, meaning the way that people interact with the notion of time out-
side of physical timings or ‘clock-time’, has been a steadily ignored area of study 
in empirical bioethics. Time is both an integral part of the social and social life. 
In this view, the way that social time interacts with patient decision-making is an 
indispensable part of upholding and supporting the autonomous, informed, con-
sent-giving patient. As Adam argues:
Many more aspects of time […] form an integral part of our lives. Some 
have to do with synchronisation, ordering, sequencing or timing, others with 
control or measurement, and still others with the time aspects of machines 
and artefacts. All have a bearing on our lives not as separate abstracted enti-
ties but as an interconnected whole. If we accept social science to be about 
studying, understanding and explaining that reality then we can expect 
social scientists to take account of time in this multiple and connected way, 
to know and acknowledge the many aspects of time in their relation and not 
on an either/or basis (Adam 1990, p. 1).
Time permeates all aspects of human life, and just as Adam has identified its 
importance to the social sciences, time was an influential factor in how partici-
pants of this study made decisions through their diagnosis, treatment and after-
care. Patient experiences reflected Adam’s assessment that ‘we have a relation-
ship to our past, present and future […] Collectively these aspects of time affect 
the way we see ourselves, our families, our society and our fellow human beings. 
They influence the timing of our interactions, the way we relate to others, and 
how we interpret daily and extraordinary events’ (1995, p. 23).
Using research on how women with cancer make fertility preservation decisions 
prior to cancer treatment (what I will call oncofertility decisions), this article will 
show how patients have this same active relationship with time. They manipulate it 
as a way to assert their autonomy, by slowing down something they do not under-
stand, or positioning decisions in a future time when they feel ready to tackle them. 
In particular I will focus on how the patients in the study understood time and how 
this understanding interacted with and influenced their decision-making. I will then 
present a more in depth analysis of the importance of social time to patient decision-
making, and the significance of social time to conceptions of patient autonomy and 
decision-making in the field of bioethics more generally. To begin I outline the back-
ground of this work, laying out the framework of the research with regards to patient 
autonomy, and sociological bioethics, before turning to the research itself.
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1.1  A brief glance at patient autonomy
There have been, and continue to be, different understandings of autonomy in bio-
ethics. Perhaps the most well-known and influential of these conceptions, developed 
by Beauchamp and Childress (2009), is sometimes called the traditional conception 
of autonomy (Paton 2017, 2018). Advocating that autonomy ought to be respected, 
such accounts fuse ‘the Kantian concept of respect for persons with Mill’s quite dif-
ferent notion of liberty; that is, persons’ choice of action should not be obstructed 
unless those actions infringe upon the liberty of others’ (Jonsen 1998, p. 335). Thus, 
having been operationalized in the informed consent processes, the traditional con-
cept of autonomy dominates patient decision-making in the UK.
Concepts such as relational autonomy, developed by Mackenzie and Stoljar 
(2000), have presented an alternative understanding that is ‘premised on the shared 
conviction […] that persons are socially embedded and that agents’ identities are 
formed within the context of social relationships and shaped by a complex of inter-
secting social determinants, such as race, class, gender and ethnicity’ (Mackenzie 
and Stoljar 2000, p. 4). According to the concept of relational autonomy, the ‘self’, 
at least in part—and, therefore, its autonomy—is derived from relations with oth-
ers and social institutions. Thus theoretical understandings of autonomy should take 
these relations into account. When contrasted with traditional theories of autonomy, 
relational autonomy can be considered to offer a less individualistic and procedural-
ist account. In this article I will take a relational account of autonomy as the theoret-
ical starting point that best captures how patients act; how they enact their autonomy 
and make decisions. However, it is unclear whether relational autonomy takes into 
account the interactions between time and patient autonomy, and so it may not offer 
a full picture of patient autonomy; a point to which I will return.
1.2  A sociological bioethics
The research presented here also serves as an example of how bioethical inquiry 
can be ‘done’ under the auspices of sociology. One important aspect of this work 
is that it takes sociological bioethics (Paton 2018) as its starting point. It examines 
the bioethical concepts of patient autonomy and patient decision-making through a 
sociological lens that not only includes sociological methods and methodologies (in 
this case empirical, qualitative interviews), but also includes social and sociologi-
cal theory. In this way, the article and the research it reports, aligns itself with the 
empirical bioethics and sociological bioethics movement that was arguably inaugu-
rated by Erica Haimes (2002) and has since undergone significant development. I 
have previously argued for the importance of viewing sociology as a constitutive 
discipline of bioethics in its own right (Paton 2017, 2018), and this article can be 
considered as an extension of this perspective, serving as yet another example of 
how bioethics can be ‘done’ using sociology.
Taking a sociological bioethics approach also aligns the methodology of this 
work with both the relational autonomy framework and Adam’s conception of time. 
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This enables the style of research necessary to access and explore those aspects 
of the social that Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) argue are essential components of 
autonomy, and that Adam argues are necessary aspects of time; namely social rela-
tionships, embedded practices and identities, and social determinants such as race 
and gender.
2  Methods and methodology
Using a sociological bioethics approach, the project examined female cancer 
patients’ experiences of making oncofertility decisions. A qualitative, one-to-one 
interview based study was designed, such that the lived experiences of those who 
participated in the study could be prioritised as the primary source of data (Brewer 
2000; Mason 2002; Silverman 2004; Paton 2017, 2018). The interviews were struc-
tured so as to focus on the social, clinical and ethical concerns of the patients.
After receiving ethical approval from Newcastle University and its associated 
NHS Trust, participants aged 18–55 were recruited to take part via cancer support 
groups in Britain. Participants were recruited via support groups for those with 
cancer. Such groups were identified using websites such as the MacMillan Cancer 
Support website,1 which identifies cancer support groups in specific areas, and via 
advertisements by local groups who placed notices in hospitals and GP practices. 
Initially only groups in the Northeast of England were contacted, however due to 
increasing interest that area was widened to include the Southeast of England as 
well. These groups were contacted by me, and those who were interested allowed 
me to make visits to the support group meetings over a series of weeks and months.
When invited to attend a support group I gave short presentations about my 
research, and interested attendees were given information sheets, a consent form and 
my contact information. Once written consent had been provided either a phone or 
face-to-face interview was arranged. No specific type of cancer, cancer stage, prog-
nosis, or remission period was targeted. To meet the inclusion criteria the women 
had to be premenopausal when they were diagnosed, and had been, or felt they 
should have been, offered fertility preservation prior to cancer treatment. Eleven 
patient participants were recruited and interviewed. All interviews were audio 
recorded with permission, transcribed and anonymised.
Alongside thematic analysis, a grounded theory approach to the analysis of the 
data was taken. This allowed important issues and major themes present in the data 
to emerge, which were then organised into major thematic categories (Ghezeljeh and 
Emami 2009; Attride-Stirling 2001). One of the major themes that emerged from the 
data, and the focus of this article, was the importance of time in making decisions.
1 https ://www.macmi llan.org.uk/infor matio n-and-suppo rt/copin g/talki ng-about -cance r/find-group s-and-
talks -near-you [Accessed: Date,—you might want to put first accessed i.e. when you were doing the 
research, and last accessed i.e. is it still functional.].
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3  Time and decision‑making
All of the interviewees discussed (unprompted) their experience of time and timing 
when making medical decisions, marking out “time” as a point of interest and con-
cern for them. Time seemed to permeate all aspects of the patient experience, from 
waiting to be diagnosed, to worrying about survival, to thinking ahead to a time they 
may or may not have, to feeling like they did not have enough time to understand, 
and finally, wondering how to plan their future given all this uncertainty. Time was 
a vital part of how they made decisions. I would like to focus on how participants 
interacted with time by discussing three major themes that emerged from the inter-
views: “Manipulating Time”, “Planning for the Future”, and “Predictive Fuzziness”.
3.1  Manipulating time
In relaying their experiences, interviewees appeared to do something that I describe 
as “manipulating time”, which they used to justify the decisions that they made. 
This manipulation came in a number of different forms. For example, some inter-
viewees placed important decisions into a far-off future, not to be dealt with in the 
present, thus distancing themselves from the decision no matter how urgent the deci-
sion may have been. Others reorganised the chronology of events in their retelling 
so that the story suited and justified the choices that they made. The manipulation 
of time was often unintentional, occurring in the retelling of their experiences, but 
served an important function in evidencing their justification for the decisions made. 
Two interviewees, Stephanie and Heather, participated in this manipulation in con-
trasting ways.2
Stephanie was made aware of fertility preservation, however she decided not to do 
anything to preserve her fertility. In justifying her decision not to preserve her fertil-
ity she describes feeling too young to think about having children, and described 
putting off those decisions:
We’ll come to that when it comes to that […] I don’t think until the time that I 
am wanting to have children will it really bother us that much. […] Obviously 
it will at the time if I do find out that I cannot. But I guess I don’t have to think 
about it at the minute, I’m too young.
Stephanie’s use of the phrase ‘when it comes to that’ is indicative of one style of 
time manipulation where interviewees put important decisions into a distant time 
that had yet to come, and so did not need to be dealt with at present. By putting her 
difficult decisions about having children into an unidentified future time, Stephanie 
manipulated time to justify her decision not to make efforts to preserve her fertility 
during her treatment.
2 As these interviews best exemplify the “manipulation” of time I take them as my focus. Nevertheless, 
the other interviewees described similar instances of manipulating time.
 A. Paton 
1 3
Stephanie did express a desire to have children, but her concerns about whether 
she will have children seemed to exist in this undetermined future time when 
she was ‘wanting to have children’. She appeared to be placing that decision in 
a future time when she would be more able to cope with the prospect of having 
children. Even contemplating the option of future children (and undergoing fertil-
ity preservation) may be to assume too much about a successful treatment. For 
Stephanie, as long as she never ‘comes to that’, meaning that she is ready to have 
children, then she never has to consider the consequences of her decision not to 
preserve her fertility. Nor does she need to consider what decisions that she will 
have to make about having children in the future. Stephanie’s focus was on get-
ting through her treatment and as a result she remained firmly rooted in the pre-
sent when she discussed her experience of making oncofertility decisions.
Stephanie also placed her emotions about having children into a future time 
so as to not deal with them in the present. For Stephanie ‘not until the time that I 
am wanting children’ would her decision to not preserve fertility really ‘bother’ 
her. In placing these decisions in a future time, she also distanced herself from 
her emotions about the decisions that she had already made about not pursuing 
fertility preservation, a decision that may impact whether or not she will have a 
choice if and when she does attempt to have children. She manipulated the timing 
of her decisions to make space for the decisions she will have to make, but also 
used this manipulation as a coping and even a protecting mechanism against the 
difficult decisions that she had already had to face and will face.
Another interviewee who manipulated time was Heather. Heather ‘moved’ 
time around to justify her decisions that went against doctor recommendations. 
As Heather was pregnant at the time of her diagnosis she had to make a deci-
sion about termination. In her interview she described how she manipulated 
time in making her decision to have her baby before going ahead with her cancer 
treatment:
I thought well, having the baby is only bagging the time that I would have 
normally spent if I had had the normal smear test 18 months down the line. 
Add the 9 month pregnancy, add the 3 month. And I think at the time that’s 
what I was thinking […] I could have ignored [the smear test appointment]. 
I could have rang them up, said “Look on your system; I’m not due another 
18 months”. “Right, fine.” they could have said to me, and given the time I 
would have had my baby. And that’s really daft, but that’s how I was thinking.
Heather manipulated time so as to consciously exclude the urgency of her cancer 
diagnosis and treatment. Heather only found out about her cervical cancer because 
she had a cervical smear done earlier than scheduled. In her mind the pregnancy 
would not have been in danger had she not done the smear early, so she decided 
to carry on as if she had never had the test. The time elapsed was equal. However 
choosing to ignore her early smear and pretend that she would have one in 9 months’ 
time, as originally scheduled, resulted in having the time to bring her baby to term, 
then deal with the cancer. Again Heather manipulated the relationship between deci-
sion time and chronological time, but in her case she ‘bagged’ the time she should 
have had and used it to bring her pregnancy to term.
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3.2  Planning for the future
Planning for the future was another way time featured in decision-making for 
interviewees. Interviewees placed importance on their ability to plan for the 
future, and linked this planning with the decisions that they would have to make 
in the future, or to preserve a particular future. Interviewees expressed frustra-
tion that planning for the future was often difficult due to the tentative survival 
percentages given by their doctors, as well as the difficulty in predicting whether 
they would retain their fertility post-treatment. The emotions expressed by inter-
viewees about their in/ability to plan their futures, and the impact that planning 
(or the inability to plan) had on their decision-making, indicates its value in help-
ing them make treatment decisions.
For example Robyn felt that planning for her future with her children helped 
her to make decisions to move forward with her treatment:
And I wasn’t going to not be there for my kids. I was determined that I was 
going to be there. […] And every time I thought about the future, thought 
about the kids it was quite difficult because that was the only time I felt any 
vulnerability. And [the treatment] wasn’t for me, it was for them, because I 
couldn’t not be here for them.
Robyn had both negative and positive associations with planning for the future 
that impacted on her decision-making in different ways. Robyn felt she needed to 
plan for the future as she wanted to be there for her children, making her deter-
mined to survive her cancer. In this case, planning for the future, specifically her 
future with her children, influenced the choices she made about treatment, sur-
vival and not pursuing fertility preservation. On the other hand, Robyn could not 
know for sure that she would survive her cancer. So while she used planning for 
the future to help her make decisions to move forward with her treatment, she 
also found that this made her vulnerable. Imagining the future was quite difficult 
as it required engaging with this vulnerability. Robyn is a good example of how 
complex the connection is between planning for the future and decision-making. 
Planning for the future was an integral part of moving forward for many of the 
interviewees, who, like Robyn, focused on how attaining a future goal affected 
and influenced their present action and the resulting decisions they made.
Anne also felt that planning for the future was integral to making decisions, 
but in this case she was thinking about future treatment, and the side-effects of 
treatment. Anne described how damaging not knowing the future implications of 
treatments could be for making decisions in the present:
I know like one of our support members […] has had radiation damage [to 
her reproductive system] […] none of this is kind of explained when they go 
for it. It’s the end goal that you’re not going to have cancer but some things 
that you’re left with you know are quite hard to deal with.
Kathleen felt similarly, stating simply about her doctor’s choice to treat her with a 
radical vulvectomy: ‘My future was never discussed’.
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While there is always a level of ontological uncertainty3 regarding the side effects 
of many treatments, Anne felt that not having these “issues” explained leaves the 
patient in a vulnerable position: they cannot plan for the future, as they are not aware 
of what the consequences of their decisions will be, and thus struggle to make deci-
sions. Kathleen felt she had even less of an opportunity to discuss her future options 
than Anne, as her healthcare professionals never discussed with her what life would 
be like after her radical vulvectomy; simply that it needed to be done to save her 
life. Many interviewees wanted further discussion with their healthcare profession-
als about their future (survival, side-effects etc.) than they had received as standard 
practice, and they viewed their relationship with their healthcare professional as an 
integral part of accessing this information. This lack of information meant that par-
ticipants felt oncofertility decisions could not be adequately situated in an appro-
priate timescale, or within their own personal frameworks, as they had neither the 
ability, nor the time, to understand the limited information they did receive. Unable 
to know their survival, their own understanding of their personal relationships, role 
within their family, job and community, and general understanding of how they as 
individuals relate to the world was thrown into uncertainty.
Interviewees were also concerned with looking to the future as a way of planning 
to keep their options open, thus securing the possibility of future decisions after can-
cer treatment. Angela expressed this best when asked why she would have liked to 
have known about fertility preservation:
If someone could’ve said “we’re going to take something and keep it to one 
side” […] Definitely, yeah. […] I would have said yes, keep the bit and then I 
can make my decisions later.
Planning for the future is similar to the manipulation of time that some interviewees 
performed, in that patients are making decisions in the present that ensure options 
to choose from in the future. As Angela explained, fertility preservation would have 
allowed her to ‘make my decisions later’, by preserving options and choices in a 
future time when she was ready to make decisions.
Monica also viewed fertility preservation as a way of preserving choice in the 
future. Monica knew she might want to have children, but at 24 she was not ready 
to make that decision, and did not want to preserve embryos with the man she was 
dating at the time she was diagnosed. Despite being pushed to freeze embryos, she 
pushed back for a better solution that did not force her to make decisions she was not 
ready to make at that time.
[…] and I hadn’t really given much thought to having children at that point. 
But I couldn’t say that I definitely didn’t want them […] So when they were 
saying that we could have had embryos frozen and all that there was just no 
3 By ontological uncertainty I am referring to the uncertainties that exist because uncertainty is a fun-
damental part of being in the world and it is impossible to know everything. For more on ontological 
uncertainty see Matthias (2010, p. 201).
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way that I wanted to do that […] So I just thought well this here Zoladex […] 
its only short term so I just decided to go with that.
Monica also felt quite strongly that patients should be made aware of all future fer-
tility preservation possibilities so that they can make what she called an ‘informed 
decision’ about the kind of future they may want and the options that they would 
like to keep open as a result:
I think so that people can make an informed decision. Rather than, if they’re 
not made aware of [fertility preservation] and then six months down the line is 
too late to do anything about it […].
Oncofertility patients are making difficult decisions whereby two time periods need 
to be taken into account at once: They have to look to the future within the context 
of their cancer diagnosis and their fertility needs, which are not always in sync or 
fully known.4 Interviewees felt that being able to plan for the future was connected 
to how much information patients receive (and understand) about their diagnosis 
and treatment. This information could then be incorporated into their individual 
understandings of themselves, their values and their desires (i.e. whether they were 
mothers, working, etc.). Alongside the importance of planning for the future, inter-
viewees expressed a need to have as much information as possible about their possi-
ble futures. Treatment outcomes were a particular focus, with interviewees wanting 
to know more about the different outcomes of cancer treatment on fertility, before 
making decisions that affect the future, and by extension, their fertility in the future. 
To manage uncertainty individuals will try to reduce the uncertainty of the uncertain 
thing (Mattias 2010), which may account for the value interviewees placed on infor-
mation about fertility preservation and cancer when planning for the future.
3.3  Predictive fuzziness
One aspect of planning for the future that may be specific to the medical context 
is something that Scully et al. (2007) call ‘predictive fuzziness’, a term developed 
from their work on genetic testing. In that study the term was used to describe how 
genetic testing cannot tell a patient everything about their disease, its course and 
severity, for example (Scully et al. 2007).
Likewise, in this study, interviewees experienced predictive fuzziness in several 
ways. For Mary, the predictive fuzziness about her prognosis was frustrating as she 
did not know how long she would live, and her doctors were unable to give her an 
exact timeline, which made it difficult for her to make decisions about keeping or 
removing her ovaries:
4 By this I mean that fertility preservation is incompatible with certain cancers. For example, if the 
cancer is so advanced and aggressive that chemotherapy cannot wait the 6–8  weeks required for egg 
retrieval, or if the treatment requires the surgical removal of the uterus, ovaries or cervix, or if the cancer 
is oestrogen receptor positive (in which case the process of retrieving eggs would actually stimulate the 
growth of the cancer).
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And that’s what I kind of went away and tried to find out about […] every-
one wants to know something different and the people are given lots of facts 
and figures and say “[…] I don’t want to know that I’ve got an 80% chance 
of living for ten years.” But from my point of view that would have been 
exactly what I wanted to know and I couldn’t make them tell me, you know 
I sort of got “Well 50/50. With your ovaries gone you’ve got good things 
going on”. You know they were very bad at sort of responding to the hard 
facts.
Here the predictive fuzziness that Mary experienced was due to the conflicting 
messages that she received from her doctor. On the one hand she had a 50% chance 
of surviving her cancer, but on the other hand she had ‘good things going on’ if 
she removed her ovaries. The phrasing of ‘good things going on’ is Mary’s own 
interpretation of her discussion, and her relationship, with her doctor. However the 
opaqueness of the statement shows how she interpreted the uncertainty surrounding 
her survival, which made it difficult to decide if removing her ovaries was worth (to 
her) this ambiguous ‘good things going on’ promoted by her doctor.
Kathleen’s experience shows how predictive fuzziness can frustrate or even 
impede decision-making, as she was so unsure if her unborn baby would survive 
the surgery to treat her cancer that she was unable to plan or make decisions for the 
birth. Kathleen often mentioned that she was young and uneducated, and so put a 
lot of faith into her doctor’s authority. When confronted with the predictive fuzzi-
ness from him Kathleen’s agency was paralysed, affecting her ability to make any 
decisions regarding herself or her future child. Her example is, perhaps, extreme. 
However her reaction to the uncertainty brought on by the lack of information and 
understanding she had about her disease points to how debilitating predictive fuzzi-
ness can be:
I just felt that I couldn’t even go out and buy clothes for this baby, and prepare 
for him coming […] I just couldn’t. […] probably frightened in case some-
thing was drastically going to go wrong. That baby was born and I didn’t even 
have any new vests […] just didn’t want to know until I knew this baby was 
alright. And even when I knew the baby was alright, I couldn’t bond, properly.
As Kathleen was the first case of vulval cancer at her hospital, her doctors were una-
ble to give her any indication of her own survival, or that of her baby’s. Kathleen’s 
uncertainty stemmed from the predictive fuzziness on survival she received from 
her doctor, which made it difficult for her to make decisions or to act to prepare for 
her unborn child. As she put it she ‘just couldn’t’.
Predictive fuzziness may be difficult to escape as ‘uncertainty is central to the ill-
ness experience’ (Babrow and Kline 2000, p. 1812). Predictive fuzziness is a lack of 
information that cannot be remedied: it is impossible to give assurance on treatment, 
success, prognosis or the return of fertility after treatment. For oncofertility patients 
an aspect of the illness experience is survival, which is very difficult to predict. One 
participant Brenda had a more matter of fact way of explaining predictive fuzziness, 
stating: ‘they can’t ever tell any cancer patient, you know, 100%. They’ve always got 
to say it’s a 99%’.
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What is striking about all the interviewees is that the 1%, to use Brenda’s phras-
ing, often loomed larger in the interviewees’ minds than the 99%. Most interviewees 
wanted both certainty and clarity about their survival, something that their doctors 
were unable to give them.
Only one interviewee took a different approach to the predictive fuzziness of her 
diagnosis and that was Heather. She used the predictive fuzziness to her advantage 
to make and justify the decision about taking her baby to term before being treated 
for her cervical cancer. Heather’s wilful, creative interpretation of time allowed her 
to use the uncertainty of her situation as a means to a desired end. As her doctors 
could not be sure that her biopsy results were not influenced by her pregnancy hor-
mones, she decided to use that uncertainty as a positive reason to keep her baby:
And he was explaining things […] “you know these biopsies could come back 
and they could be less […] And the other thing to remember is that when you 
are pregnant, your hormones, we’re not really getting an exact measurement of 
what is going on inside there, I want you to keep that in mind”. And I always 
kept that in mind. And when I did get the [biopsy] results back, and they did 
say the worst is the worst and it’s what we feared, I always kept that in the back 
of my head. I’m pregnant, and the hormones […] it can change after 3 months. 
So I had a lot of things that I think just pacified, or I tried to pacify myself.
Heather used this predictive fuzziness to her advantage. Instead of seeing herself 
with cancer of an unknown severity, Heather took this to mean that she might not 
have cancer, or that it might not be severe. She was waiting to be proved wrong 
in her assessment that ‘it can change after 3  months’ due to her hormones and 
pregnancy.
Heather was in fact an exception in other ways among the interviewees, in that 
throughout her diagnosis and treatment she preferred to have the minimum informa-
tion possible about her situation. She felt that she was unable to cope with knowing 
all the details and it seemed that she was using this self-imposed lack of information 
as a protective measure: it was a decision to suspend decision-making until a later 
time when she had achieved her goal of bringing her baby to term. This is, per-
haps, why the predictive fuzziness she encountered did not frustrate her, but instead 
helped her to justify her actions, and as she said, ‘pacify myself’.
4  Discussion
Time was an important part of the interviewees’ experience, and the relationship 
between decision-making and time/timing was multifaceted. For interviewees the 
importance of time was not about having the time to make a decision, but about how 
social time interacted with their perceived futures and the retrospective narratives of 
their cancer story: all of which patients considered necessary for the decisions that 
they made. Together all these different ways of interacting and experiencing time 
amounted to an attempt by the interviewees to cope with the huge amount of uncer-
tainty that cancer diagnosis can bring, and the effect that uncertainty has on patients 
trying to exercise their autonomy by making difficult, but essential, decisions.
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Interviewees often manipulated their understanding of time and timing when 
reflecting on how and why they made their decisions. Manipulating time not only 
helped interviewees to explain the actions that they took, but it also helped them feel 
in control, allowing interviewees to claim some ownership over their actions dur-
ing a difficult period, and to create a space for future decisions to exist. This space 
was achieved by breaking up their decisions through time, so that the interviewees 
gained some control and justification over their decisions, making difficult decisions 
more manageable and thus possible to make. The creation of this space also gave 
participants agency over the decisions they had made and the decisions they may 
have to make.
This argument is supported by Scully et al.’s (2007) suggestion that the manipula-
tion of time allows patients ‘moral space’ within which to make their own difficult 
decisions and exercise their agency. Scully et al. (2007) found similar time manipu-
lation in their study of patients undergoing genetic testing. They describe a scenario 
whereby their participants manipulated the relationship between decision time and 
chronological time to create moral space by ‘an active manipulation of their subjec-
tive experiences of time passing, by fractioning the anticipated future into an imme-
diate step and further steps that could be thought about later.’ (Scully et al. 2007, p. 
211).
By adopting a cross-that-bridge-when-I-get-there approach patients are shifting 
their temporal field such that it ‘separates difficult moral decisions that in practice 
are interlinked’ (Scully et al. 2007, p. 214). This type of ‘fractioning’, as described 
by Scully et al., is similar to the way that interviewees in this study assigned their 
decisions to a future unknown time. The nature of fertility helps to facilitate this 
cross-that-bridge approach adopted by the participants, as the loss of fertility is dif-
ficult to predict, and most individuals can only be diagnosed as infertile once they 
have started trying for a pregnancy: i.e. when they become ready to cross the bridge.
Manipulating time served to facilitate, justify, cope with, and protect the inter-
viewees from decisions that had to be made, allowing them to feel as if they were 
still maintaining some control. In doing this, interviewees were creating the ‘moral 
space’ necessary to exercise their autonomy and make difficult decisions themselves.
Interviewees needed that space to deal with the difficulty they had in planning for 
the future. They often had to make decisions about things that had yet to happen or 
that they had not even thought about yet (for example, whether they wanted to have 
children). Planning for the future is particularly hard for oncology patients as their 
prognosis is uncertain, making it difficult for them to make decisions about their 
future when they cannot know if they will survive to that future. They are simultane-
ously experiencing a lack of information and an uncertainty of survival. These deci-
sions were doubly difficult when considering fertility preservation as patients have 
to make decisions about their future survival, as well as their future fertility, and 
these two futures are not always compatible.
An integral part of moving forward for interviewees was planning for the future, 
and in making decisions they focused on how the future affects and influences their 
present action. Planning for the future had a number of positive consequences for 
interviewees that helped facilitate their autonomy: for example it could be about 
hope, about attending an event in the future, or be as simple as choosing a cancer 
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treatment based on the future side-effects. Planning for the future was also a way 
for interviewees to preserve and postpone options and choices for themselves in the 
future that they were not prepared to make a decision about in the present.
Planning for the future is also how patients ‘colonize’ that future, whereby indi-
viduals extend or project their consideration of present needs to include considera-
tion of their future needs (Hagerstrand 1985; Adam 1990). Patients do this for the 
same reason that all people do, to try and secure the safety of their futures and elimi-
nate uncertainty (Adam 1990). For oncofertility patients, fertility preservation is a 
way of ensuring one’s imaginary future existence by such colonisation, thus secur-
ing both future fertility and future options and choices about fertility.
Similarly, while planning for the future was experienced by participants as the 
enacting of patients’ autonomy based on the information they are given and under-
stood, predictive fuzziness was experienced by the patient as a lack of information 
and understanding about their future that had the potential to thwart patient auton-
omy. Uncertainty due to predictive fuzziness about their prognosis was a key feature 
of interviewees’ experience of time in the decision-making context, and how they 
constructed, or could not construct, the long term framework within which all peo-
ple make decisions (Scully et al. 2007). ‘Knowing’ their futures was understood by 
the interviewees as having information on their current condition that they could use 
to make decisions moving forward through time in a way that made them feel com-
fortable and in control of their lives, an affirmation of the agency that they felt was 
slipping away. Predictive fuzziness meant that their futures were sometimes impos-
sible to know, as their prognosis was unknown, effectively eliminating a source of 
information that patients consider important when making decisions.
Uncertainty is often related to ‘the sufficiency, reliability and validity of infor-
mation’ (Babrow and Kline 2000, p. 1810), and predictive fuzziness in relation to 
a cancer diagnosis means uncertainty about survival, thus making decisions about 
the future difficult. Patients value predictive information about their disease when 
planning, preparing and making decisions about the future. For participants predic-
tive fuzziness became a form of epistemological uncertainty; uncertainty about spe-
cific information and the applicability of that information (Mattias 2010). Interview-
ees experienced this epistemological uncertainty alongside the existing ontological 
uncertainty that everyone experiences as part of living in the world and the impos-
sibility of knowing everything (Mattias 2010). Interviewees expressed a frustration 
with epistemological uncertainty as they felt that they did not have sufficient infor-
mation (as patients) about survival and treatment, making it difficult, if not impos-
sible for them to make decisions and, by extension, to exercise their autonomy.
This uncertainty influences patient decision-making as it acts as a road block to 
achieving the informed understanding that patients feel is critical to decision-mak-
ing, and which is also considered a crucial criterion of most conceptions of patient 
autonomy (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000; Beauchamp and Childress 2009; Paton 
2017). In oncofertility the combined predictive fuzziness of cancer prognosis and 
future fertility is impossible to rectify as there is no way of knowing with certainty 
that a patient will survive treatment with their fertility intact. Interviewees felt that 
not understanding, or not knowing all the information about the various avail-
able futures (in terms of fertility preservation, treatment outcomes and treatment 
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side-effects), made it difficult to know which future to aim for and thus how to tailor 
their actions in the present. Given the importance of informed understanding to the 
concept of patient autonomy as a whole, the ramification of medical uncertainty like 
predictive fuzziness requires further research to better understand how uncertainty 
and time interact with patient autonomy.
While this may seem a small point about information access, it is actually part of 
a larger issue concerning the facilitation of patient autonomy with regards to time. 
As Scully et al. (2007) found, informed consent is built on the principle that patients 
understand the information given to them, and that they continue to understand the 
information and have access to this information throughout the decision-making pro-
cess: i.e. understanding is developed over time, it persists through time and in future 
time. However previous research has found that, in practice, patients have difficulty 
accessing and understanding medical information, and that while emphasis has been 
put on allowing more time for continuous access to information, patients vary in 
their ability to gain access to, and understand, information (Towle et al. 2006; Mar-
tinez et al. 2009; McMullen 2012; Zikmund-Fisher et al. 2012; Kim et al. 2013).
Additionally, since much of cancer treatment and fertility preservation occurs 
over a period of time, it is necessary to extend the level of choice across this period 
of time as well; to take what Scully et al. (2007) argue is the ‘longer perspective’. 
Decisions in cancer treatment are simultaneously decisions for the now and for the 
future. These patients exist in two temporal arenas: their ‘now’ selves and their 
‘future’ selves. They balance and compromise between the two, as cancer treat-
ment decisions affect the availability of future fertility options. The decisions that 
oncofertility patients make in the ‘now’ are influenced by past decisions, and help 
them to ‘colonize the future’ (Hagerstrand 1985), projecting their decisions forward 
in such a way that they feel comfortable with the choices they have made. These 
three temporal arenas of past, present and future make up the long-term framework 
within which patients make decisions. Taking the longer perspective also respects 
the various relational influences on autonomy that are constantly at play, and ever 
changing, for the cancer patient. This includes things like social conventions about 
having children, expectations of the cancer patient’s role in their families and in 
society, and the dynamic power relationship between the patient and the oncologist. 
All of which will help to make up the patient’s long-term framework, which they use 
to make decisions.
Adam describes this process of travelling across the long-term framework as ‘the 
power of the human mind to visit past events, to re-invent them, create alternative 
versions and plan a multitude of futures. We are able to imagine the world in a pro-
jected future-present upon which we can reflect and make out choices’ (Adam 1995: 
18). Despite its importance, the medical context often truncates this framework, 
requiring decisions that affect the future to be made acutely, with little time for the 
necessary reflection. As a result the decisional framework suddenly becomes very 
small and very immediate, effectively excluding the long-term framework altogether.
While many bioethical concepts of autonomy consider more than the immediate 
space around these acute moments of decision-making, most focus on the legitimacy 
of the acute decision being made when outlining their criteria for/description of 
autonomy in medicine (consider, for example, the emphasis placed on competence 
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and informed consent at the exact moment of consent). Doing this focuses on what 
is needed for the patient to maintain autonomy at the point of decision-making, 
but not on how the patient can maintain their autonomy within the context of the 
patient’s long-term framework. This is a point supported by Adam who argues that 
individuals ‘create their futures as a continuing affair in the present […] the future is 
no longer merely predicted, it is actively constructed’ (Adam 1990, p. 98). Medical 
decisions are not discrete points in time that can and should be separated out from 
each other. Instead, building on Adam’s argument, decisions made within the medi-
cal context are like any other decision made in an individual’s life, and are thus part 
of and influenced by the ‘continuing affair’ that is that person’s life, an affair whose 
importance is recognised in relational accounts of autonomy.
Adam’s phrasing of ‘actively constructed’ implies that agency is embedded 
within the long-term framework, and decisions that are made within its scope are 
a reflection of that agency. Taking account of a patient’s long-term framework is an 
affirmation of their agency over their own lives, and allowing them to colonize their 
medical future (to borrow and bend Hagerstrand’s phrase) is a facilitation of their 
autonomy in the clinical encounter.
Other aspects of a person’s long-term framework are arguably their relation-
ships, their social context, culture, gender and identity. These are all aspects of a 
person’s life that influence their decision-making, and this belief is the core of rela-
tional autonomy (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000). Time is not as prevalent in relational 
accounts of autonomy, but that is not to say that the importance of time cannot be 
easily incorporated into relational autonomy. As Benner and Wrubel (1989) argue in 
their account of caring, time is crucial as it is part of our very being. It is a phenom-
enon as present in our lives as those listed by Mackenzie and Stoljar. Hall articulates 
this best, arguing that ‘[t]ime is relational, circular and creates meaning, and it com-
bines past, present and future’ (Hall 2005, p. 95). (Social) time is more than clock-
time, it is a crucial link between what Hall calls ‘being and doing’. In this sense time 
is an integral, essential force in autonomy, reflecting autonomy’s relationality, its 
complex relationship between agency and action, and the operationalisation of that 
autonomy across the long-term framework within which every person makes deci-
sions. Time and autonomy cannot, and should not, be separated out from each other, 
and theories of autonomy should incorporate time into their accounts to reflect this 
essential relationship between the two.
5  Conclusion
The continued refrain throughout this research was that oncofertility decisions, and 
the resulting fertility preservation, was seen as choice preservation for the future. 
Fertility preservation allowed patients to plan for the future without having to com-
mit to a child, just to the (future) option of having a child. The focus of interview-
ees was less on the ability to have children after cancer but, instead, on the ability 
to choose to have children after cancer, if that was what they decided: a subtle but 
important distinction that would not force patients to make decisions that they were 
not ready to make.
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When interviewees felt uncomfortable making decisions they attempted to manip-
ulate time to gain the moral space necessary to make their decisions. Interviewees 
felt that patients need the time to plan for the future in order to make decisions in 
the present. This is part of their temporal understanding of the long-term framework 
within which they make decisions. To make these decisions, patients want and need 
information about their futures. This information is not always easily available due 
to the predictive fuzziness that cancer diagnosis imposes on the patient.
Patients also use time to assert their autonomy by creating space in which to 
make decisions, or ‘keep’ decisions until a later time. Interviewees made it clear that 
having more time would have helped them to make decisions with which they were 
comfortable. I interpret this as their own attempts at supporting and respecting their 
autonomy. Most interviewees felt that a better relationship with their doctors would 
facilitate this, as a good relationship with their doctor would facilitate a continued 
understanding of information throughout the medical encounter, thereby creating 
more ‘moral space’ for the patient to exercise autonomous decision-making.
This continuous understanding of, and interacting with, information over time is a 
vital part of maintaining and facilitating patient autonomy. However many theoreti-
cal conceptions of autonomy focus only on the point of decision-making, and not on 
the moments that precede and proceed from it. Failure to facilitate patients’ continu-
ous informed understanding is a failure to acknowledge the long-term frameworks in 
which patients make decisions. Clinicians and ethicists often see the decisions to be 
made as close in time to the clinical encounter, but to the patient the whole process 
has been going on longer than the point of contact with the clinician, and will con-
tinue on after as well. It is important to allow for the patient’s long-term perspective 
as it may be necessary for the patient to repeatedly review the information so that 
they feel they understand it within their long-term framework.
Respecting the long-term framework in which the patient makes decisions is 
important to consider not only when respecting patient autonomy, but also when 
facilitating patient autonomy. It is not just the clinical encounter, but the patient’s 
whole life story, values, and beliefs for their present and future that inform their 
decisions. These values and beliefs are aspects of decisions that will be made about 
fertility preservation and cancer treatment that exist totally outside the clinical 
encounter, but reside comfortably in the patient’s long-term framework, contributing 
to how she asserts her agency, moral competency and autonomy.
Social time and decision-making are interconnected in ways that are integral to 
patient autonomy. How an individual understands and interacts with time is impor-
tant for understanding and exercising their autonomy, as their understanding of time 
‘constitutes the difference between having choices and seeing one’s social life as 
determined.’ (Adam 1990, p. 5). Seen through the lens of bioethics this distinction 
can be understood as the difference between autonomy (what Adam calls ‘having 
choices’) and non-autonomy (what Adam calls ‘seeing one’s life as determined’). If 
autonomy and being autonomous are to continue as fundamental concepts in bioeth-
ics, then the relationship between autonomy and social time should also be valued, 
and by extension social time should be a substantial feature of interest to bioethics 
research in the future.
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